Hardware Security

Trust that starts at the silicon.

Hardware Security protects the devices, firmware, and supply chains that every layer of software silently assumes are safe — embedded controllers, IoT fleets, edge gateways, and the boards they run on. If the firmware is compromised, nothing above it can be trusted, so that is where we begin.

What it does

Software security assumes the machine underneath is honest. For a fleet of devices in the field — sensors on a network, controllers on a factory floor, terminals in a vehicle — that assumption is doing a great deal of work. A device with unsigned firmware, debug ports left enabled, keys stored in plain flash, or an update path anyone can spoof is a device an attacker owns permanently, wherever it is installed and however good the cloud behind it is.

We work at that layer. Firmware is analysed for what it exposes and how it boots. A hardware root of trust is designed or verified so keys never leave protected storage. Update and provisioning pipelines are hardened so only your signed code runs and only devices you made get credentials. Physical and side-channel attacks are attempted in the lab before they are attempted anywhere else. And the supply chain — who made which component, and how you know — is traced and documented.

Capabilities

Firmware analysis and secure-boot review

Firmware images are extracted and analysed for exposed services, hard-coded credentials, and vulnerable components. The boot chain is verified end to end so that only signed, measured code executes.

Root of trust and key storage design

Selection and integration of secure elements, TPMs, or on-die trust zones so private keys are generated and used inside protected hardware and never appear in readable memory.

Physical and side-channel assessment

Debug interface probing, glitching, and power and timing analysis against your hardware, with findings that tell you what an attacker with the device in hand can actually do.

Secure update and provisioning pipelines

Signed, versioned, rollback-protected updates delivered over authenticated channels, and a provisioning flow that issues each device its own identity without exposing secrets on the production line.

Supply-chain and component provenance

Bills of materials for hardware and firmware, verification of component sources, and tamper-evidence controls for the path from fabrication to deployment.

Device identity and attestation

Each device proves what it is and what it is running to your backend cryptographically, so a cloned or modified unit is refused before it can join the fleet.

Frameworks we work against

Device security is assessed against the specifications that regulators, certification bodies, and enterprise buyers already require.

TPM 2.0
Trusted Platform Module integration for key protection, measured boot, and remote attestation.
Secure and measured boot
Verified boot chains from immutable ROM through bootloader to application, with measurements available for attestation.
FIPS 140-3
Cryptographic module requirements for products that must demonstrate validated cryptography.
IEC 62443
Security levels and component requirements for industrial and operational-technology devices and systems.
ETSI EN 303 645
The baseline requirements for consumer IoT devices, including no default passwords, secure updates, and vulnerability disclosure.
Common Criteria
Preparation and evidence for evaluation against protection profiles where formal certification is required.

Why teams bring us in

If firmware is compromised, nothing above it matters

Cloud controls, encryption, and application hardening all assume an honest device. We make that assumption true, and give you a way to check it remotely.

Provisioning that survives the factory floor

Device identities are issued in a way that does not require trusting the contract manufacturer with your keys. What ships is yours, and only what you made can enrol.

Attestation you can verify, not just believe

Every device in the fleet can prove its firmware version and configuration to your backend on demand. A tampered unit is a refused connection, not a forensic surprise.

Send us a device.

Ship one unit and its firmware image. We will tell you what an attacker with it on their bench could do, what the fleet is exposed to, and how to close it before the next production run.